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ABSTRACT We propose a new scheme to secure a wireless-powered untrusted cooperative-communication
network, where a legitimate source node (Alice) transmits her information messages to a legitimate
destination node (Bob) through the multiple amplify-and-forward untrusted relays. The relay nodes are
assumed to be honest but curious nodes; hence, they are trusted at the service level but are untrusted at
the information level. To reduce the energy consumption of the network, only one relay node is selected in
each time slot to forward Alice’s information signal. We assume a power-splitting-based energy-harvesting
scheme, where each relay node splits its received signal into information and energy streams. Since the
relay nodes are assumed to be untrusted at the information level, they attempt to decode the information
intended to Bob while harvesting energy at the same time. When the relaying mode is selected, the scheme
is realized over two non-overlapping time phases. To prevent any information leakage to the untrusted relay
nodes, Bob and a cooperative jammer (John) inject jamming (artificial noise) signals during the first phase.
During the second phase, the untrusted relay nodes that will not be forwarding the information signal must
harvest energy to accumulate more energy to help Alice in future time slots. Moreover, the cooperative
jammer will jam the untrusted relays to further power their batteries and prevent them from decoding the
information-forwarding relay signal in case they decided to cheat and decode it. We model the battery state
transitions at each relay as a finite-state Markov chain and analyze it. Our numerical results show the security
gains of our proposed scheme relative to two benchmark schemes.
INDEX TERMS Battery, energy harvesting, secrecy, untrusted relaying, relay selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency (RF) energy-harvesting (EH) schemes have
gained increased interest recently as a promising solution
to energize the battery-based wireless communication nodes
in a wireless communication network [1]. Under the
RF-EH paradigm, the wireless nodes convert the ambient
RF transmissions into a direct current (DC) electricity. This
prolongs their battery lifetimes with self-sufficient energy
supply. Since RF transmissions can simultaneously carry both
information and energy, an EH node is capable of decoding
the information in a signal and converting a portion of that
signal into energy. This motivates simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) [2].
The efficiency of RF-EH schemes is a function of many
parameters including the network topology as mentioned
in, e.g., [3] and the references therein. In particular,
due to channel randomness, where the channel gain can
be low for some times and high for other times, and
its monotonically-decreasing behavior with distance, only
wireless nodes that are relatively close to the transmitting
nodes (e.g., base-stations or uplink users) can benefit
from the energy carried over the RF transmissions. These
wireless nodes do not only collect more wireless energy
during the downlink (DL) phase but also use less transmit
power during the uplink (UL) phase as well. In contrast,
the nodes that are distant from the base-station will
harvest less energy and will have to use more transmit
powers during the uplink phases. Hence, it is necessary
to have cooperative relay nodes in the middle between
the base-station and the legitimate users to mitigate
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the channel fading effects and increase both information
transmission and energy transfer rates. SWIPT schemes
provide new opportunities for wireless-powered cooperative
communications (WPCC), where the relays (which can be
other legitimate entities/users in the network) are able to
cooperate with the source node more frequently since they
do not use their own energies [4]. In this energy-efficient
system design, the wireless relays are solely depending on the
energy collected from the RF transmissions to aid the source
nodes.
Using SWIPT schemes, the relay nodes divide their
received signals into two distinct streams. A stream
that will be passed to the EH circuitry and the other
stream will be used for data processing and information
forwarding. The two most efficient relaying schemes
proposed in the SWIPT literature are: 1) the time-switching
relaying (TSR) where the time is orthogonally-divided
between EH and information-decoding tasks [5]; and
2) the power-splitting relaying (PSR) where the signal
splitting is performed in the power domain using a power
splitter [5]. Chen et al. [6] investigated the PSR scheme
in the multiple-user multiple-relay systems. Nasir et al. [7]
investigated the relay interference channels [7]. Since the
amount of harvested energy in a single-transmission period
is small, the performance of the relayed transmissions is
low. Hence, extensive research efforts have been directed
to developing the harvest-store-use (HSU) scheme. In
particular, instead of using the entire energy harvested in one
transmission cycle, the harvested energy is first accumulated
and stored in a battery for a while and then adaptively used for
information transmissions [8]–[10]. In the TSR scheme, the
relay nodes switch between EH and information forwarding
from one transmission cycle to another. Under HSU-WPC
schemes, the EH nodes use several EH blocks to accumulate
enough energy for information transmissions. Hence, the
reliability and secrecy of WPCC are enhanced with the
minimum energy consumption [11].
A. RELATED WORKS
Since the EH relays are solely powered by the energy of
the RF transmissions, in WPCC networks, the relays may
not always be ready to help since the energy harvested is
often much smaller than that required for data transmissions.
Hence, the HSU approach is a promising solution to stabilize
the energy supply for information transmissions over time.
Nasir et al. [8] considered energy accumulation for a
two-hop system with one relay node, where the relay first
stores energy in an infinite energy-storage battery and starts
the information forwarding mode as soon as it harvests
enough energy to transmit with a constant predetermined
transmit power. Krikidis et al. [9] assumed a finite energy
storage at the relay node and proposed a greedy-switching
scheme where the relay node transmits when its residual
energy ensures reliable decoding at the destination node.
Hence, the reception reliability and energy consumption
are simultaneously improved. In practice, a set of relays
should be deployed between the source and its destination to
enhance both reliability and security by introducing diversity
to mitigate channel fading.
Relay-selection schemes enhance the energy-efficiency
and system’s performance by selecting the best relay
(or set of relays) for information forwarding [12], [13].
When the relay nodes are equipped with energy-storage
batteries, the design of relay-selection schemes in WPCC
systems differs from conventional cooperative networks
where all nodes have reliable power supplies. In fact,
the relay-selection criteria must take into consideration
both available energy at the relays and the required
information rate. Therefore, battery-aware relay-selection
(BARS) schemes were proposed in [14]–[16] to improve the
reliability of the multi-relay WPCC networks by exploiting
both channel state information (CSI) and battery state
information (BSI) to make the relay-selection decisions. In
the BARS schemes, the relay nodes with battery energy
levels exceeding a predetermined threshold required for
information transmission will first form a subset, since not
all relays will have the same energy level, then feedback
their CSI to the source node. Afterwards, the source
node selects the best relay among the subset of candidate
relays to forward its information signal to the destination
node. While the selected relay node decodes the source
information signal, the remaining relay nodes scavenge
energy from the source signal. Krikidis [17] investigated
various relay-selection schemes for WPCC systems with
multiple randomly-distributed relay nodes. The EH relay
nodes help the source’s transmission only when their batteries
are full. Liu [14] assumed that each relay node accumulates
a minimum energy level to be a candidate for selection.
Then, each of the candidate relay nodes sends its CSI. These
works assume finite-size batteries at the EH relay nodes
which switch between energy harvesting and information
forwarding from one coherence time (i.e., transmission
block) to another.
Although the broadcast nature of wireless channels helps
in energy transfer to many nodes at the same time, wireless
channels are vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks and, hence,
the confidentiality of data transmissions can be compromised.
This is because any node with an RF transceiver can overhear
the ongoing communications in a wireless network and,
possibly, determine the identity of the communicating nodes.
Secure communications in multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) SWIPT systems were investigated in [18] where
the source node splits its transmit power to send confidential
messages to the information receiver and an artificial
noise (AN) signal to prevent the energy receivers from
eavesdropping the information. In this context, most existing
research work has focused on the use of cooperative jamming
(CJ) schemes to secure the WPCC systems [19]–[23].
In [19]–[22], the jammers harvest energy from the source
node and then use the harvested energy to performCJ. In [24],
the secrecy of an EH relay network is improved by using the
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commonly-used destination-based jamming (DBJ) scheme
where the destination node sends AN signals to confuse the
eavesdropper. The generated AN signal by the destination
also serves as a new source of RF energy to be harvested by
the EH nodes [23].
Sun et al. [25] showed that CJ enables secure two-hop
communications through an untrusted relay which could be
otherwise not possible. Kalamkar and Banerjee investigated
the security of the wireless-powered untrusted cooperative
communication (WPUCC) where the relay nodes eavesdrop
on the legitimate transmissions although they are cooperating
in forwarding the source’s information. The authors showed
that the secrecy performance is improved when the relay
node is located closer to the destination. A sufficient and
necessary condition for obtaining a positive secrecy rate
for an RF-EH untrusted cooperative PSR scheme was
derived in [27]. Mabrouk et al. [28] proposed a scheme
to secure relay-aided transmissions when the relay is
untrusted and in the presence of alien eavesdropping attacks.
Wang et al. [29] proposed a secure communication scheme
for untrusted two-way relaying systems. Zhao et al. [30]
proposed a joint power-splitting and secure beamforming
design. It was shown in [31] that, if there is a direct link
between the source and its destination, the deployment of
untrusted relays in the network will be useless when the target
secrecy rate is large.
Although the BARS schemes have been investigated
widely in the non-eavesdropping scenarios, energy accumul-
ation under a secrecy constraint has not beenwell-investigated
yet. In most existing work, the HSU model is investigated
where information relaying is performed when enough
energy is accumulated through the time-switching scheme.
Zhou et al. [10], Yuan et al. [32], and Liu et al. [33]
investigated energy accumulation in PSR-based systems
where information transmission and energy transfer are
employed simultaneously. This approach is called the
harvest-use-store (HUS) scheme. Unlike the HSU scheme,
in the HUS scheme, the expenditure of the collected energy
is prioritized by information transmission and the remaining
harvested energy will be stored in the nodes’ batteries for
future use. Zhou et al. [10] proposed the HUS relaying
strategy with distributed beamforming in wirelessly-powered
multiple-relay scenarios. Liu et al. [33] investigated the
HUS scheme in a full-duplex relay network where the relay
switches between two rechargeable batteries for charging and
discharging during two consecutive communication cycles.
Mabrouk et al. [34] proposed a relay-selection scheme for
untrusted-relay networks when the source node transmits a
jamming signal that is previously shared with the destination
node. The assumption of previously shared jamming/AN
signals might not always be possible. Unlike [34], we propose
a new secure scheme when the destination transmits a
jamming signal and in the presence of a cooperative jammer
that helps in both powering and jamming the untrusted
EH-RF relay nodes.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
Motivated by the above work, we propose a joint DBJ and
CJ scheme to reduce the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
of the WPUCC systems under untrusted relaying. Moreover,
since the untrusted relays have batteries to accumulate the RF
harvested energy, they will be able to better serve the source
node in forwarding its data to the destination. The relay
that maximizes the instantaneous secrecy rate is selected in
each time slot. Bao and Cuu [35] investigate a distributed
switch-and-stay combining technique to secure a dual-hop
relay network where the destination switches to and stays
with either the direct link or the relaying link. In [36], based
on the CSI estimate, the source performs DL information
transmission either directly or cooperatively with the relay.
Apart from recovering some of the spectral loss inherent
to half-duplex cooperative relaying, the proposed scheme
reduces energy constraints on the relay nodes so as to increase
their batteries’ lifetimes.
We propose a new jamming-based scheme to secure the
transmissions in wireless-powered untrusted relay networks.
The proposed scheme exploits both the CSI of the wireless
links and the energy-state information (ESI) of the relays’
batteries. Our contributions are summarized as follows
• Considering the energy constraint at the untrusted
relay nodes, we design a new scheme to secure the
transmissions from Alice to Bob where only a subset of
the relays will be active during a time slot and only one
relay is selected for information forwarding to reduce
the energy expenditure in the network.
• Under the practical assumption of finite-capacity energy
storage at the untrusted RF-EH relays, we analyze
the dynamic behaviors of the relays’ batteries by
modelling each battery as a finite-state Markov chain.
We derive closed-form expressions for the steady-state
distributions. In addition, we analyze the instantaneous
secrecy rate and the SOP of the system under the
proposed scheme.
Notation: Unless otherwise stated, lower- and upper-case
bold letters denote vectors andmatrices, respectively. Fx(y) =
Pr{x ≤ y} denotes the cumulative distribution function
(CDF). CM×N denotes the set of all complex matrices of size
M × N . (·)> and (·)∗ denote transpose and Hermitian (i.e.,
complex-conjugate transpose) operations, respectively. | · |
cardinality of a set.E{·} denotes statistical expectation. 0M×N
denotes the all-zero matrix with size M × N . θ = 1 − θ .
diag = {·} denotes a diagonal matrix with the enclosed
elements as its diagonal elements. [·]+ = max{0, ·} returns
the maximum between the argument and zero. A list of the
key variables is given in Table 1.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURE PROTOCOL
DESCRIPTION
We investigate a WPCC network composed of a half-duplex
source node, Alice, that communicates with a half-duplex
legitimate destination node, Bob, through a cluster of
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TABLE 1. List of key variables.
FIGURE 1. System and transmission models.
K untrusted amplify-and-forward (AF) half-duplex relay
nodes1 ({rk}Kk=1) in the presence of a cooperative half-duplex
jamming node, John, as shown in Fig. 1. We consider that
each relay is an EH node and equipped with an RF-EH
circuitry with a finite-storage rechargeable battery whose
capacity is Emax energy units. We assume that the relay nodes
employ a PSR scheme and they can accumulate the harvested
energy from the ambient RF transmissions before relaying the
information to Bob. Alice, Bob, and the relays are equipped
with a single antenna. However, John is equipped with NJ
antennas.
The channel coefficient between node i and node j, where
i ∈ {a, J , r1, r2, . . . , rK } and j ∈ {r1, r2, . . . , rK , b},
is denoted by hi,j. We assume a flat-fading channel
model where a channel coefficient remains fixed for the
duration of one transmission block of length T and changes
independently from one transmission time to another. If the
wireless channels exhibit Rayleigh fading, the channel gain
1The relay nodes are assumed to be co-located in a clustered fashion close
to each other. This can be realized with a long-term routing process. As
discussed in [37]–[39], an efficient clustering scheme can be used to organize
the relay nodes in a cluster based on average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
gi,j , |hi,j|2 is distributed as an exponential random variable
with mean D−βij , where Dij is the Euclidean distance between
node i and node j and β is the path-loss exponent. The thermal
noise at a receiving node is modeled as an additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and unit variance.
For clarity, we define 1i,j = gi,jPi where Pi is the transmit
power at node i.
A. WIRETAP CODE DESIGN
The random binning scheme is used to secure the
transmissions [40]. Consider the scenario where Alice
transmits her information packets to Bob without the aid
of the relay nodes. In a given time slot, Alice adaptively
selects her transmission rate to be close to the instantaneous
rate of the Alice-Bob link such that no outage events occur.
Alice uses a codebook C(2nRA−B , 2nRs , n) where RA−B is the
instantaneous rate of the Alice-Bob link and Rs is the target
secrecy rate (i.e., number of information bits per channel use),
n is the codeword length, 2nRA−B is the number of codewords
in the codebook, and 2nRs is the number of confidential
information messages to transmit. The 2nRA−B codewords are
randomly grouped into 2nRs bins. To transmit a confidential
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message w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nRs}, Alice adopts a stochastic
encoder to randomly select a codeword from bin w and
transmit it over the wireless channel. In our scenario where
the information is transmitted as a packet, the encoder will
set a constant value for the target secrecy rate Rs. When
Alice’s transmission is aided with one of the relay nodes, the
same coding will be used but with the relevant transmission
rate (i.e., the codebook rate will be the rate of the end-to-end
transmission as will be shown shortly).
Since the information messages are transmitted at a fixed
rate, there are two types of outage events
1) Connection outage: This outage event occurs when the
instantaneous rate of the channel is below the target
secrecy rateRs.
2) Secrecy rate outage: This outage event occurs when
the instantaneous secrecy rate of channel is below the
target secrecy rateRs.
B. TRANSMISSION MODEL
Since the two communication hops are intercepted by the
untrusted relays, the DBJ in addition to the CJ scheme
is adopted to protect the source’s confidential information.
Since the destination (Bob) generates the AN signal, he can
cancel it prior to information decoding but the untrusted
relays cannot. Similarly, we assume that the jammer designs
its AN precoding matrix in such a way that it only affects the
relay node that will not forward Alice’s information. Hence,
the jamming signal by John will not affect the relay selected
for information forwarding or Bob. The precoding matrix at
John for the various transmission modes and time phases are
carefully designed in the next subsection.
The untrusted relay nodes are assumed to be non-colluding
which means that they intercept the information independ-
ently. Alice, Bob, and John are assumed to be equipped with
reliable power supplies and transmit at a constant transmit
power levels Pa, Pb, and PJ , respectively. On the other
hand, the untrusted relays are assumed to be low-cost nodes
with RF-EH capability and they are solely powered by the
ambient RF transmissions from the legitimate nodes. Hence,
the additional data rate that will be achieved in the system
due to the presence of the relays is attained with no extra
power. A relay node that has stored (accumulated) enough
wireless energy to transmit at the required power level P◦
is referred to as an active relay. The set of relays that have
accumulated the required energy are referred to as the active
relays. The relay nodes will try to eavesdrop on the ongoing
transmissions from Alice. Hence, using the PSR protocol,
the relay nodes perform information decoding and energy
harvesting simultaneously. We assume that all relay nodes
adopt the same power-splitting factor with energy-conversion
efficiency 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. The power-splitting ratios for
information processing (decoding or forwarding) and energy
harvesting are denoted as ρ = 1− ρ and ρ, respectively.
In our proposed protocol, instead of relaying all the
packets, a selected relay is used only to forward the
information packets for which the transmission through
the direct link (Alice-Bob link) is not secure (i.e., cannot
securely support the target secrecy rate Rs). To realize
this scheme, based on the success/failure of the direct
transmission, Alice selects to either directly communicate
with Bob or communicate through only one of the untrusted
relays. If the instantaneous secrecy rate from Alice to
Bob lies above a target secrecy rate Rs,2 the direct
single-hop transmission (DSHT) mode is selected otherwise
the cooperative relay dual-hop transmission (RDHT) mode is
selected. If the transmission is unsecured under both modes,
the system is in secrecy outage and all nodes will remain
idle.
In our proposed scheme, full CSI of the communication
links should be available at the central unit which can be
either Alice or Bob. Prior to information signal transmission,
a two-phase training is used to acquire the instantaneous CSI
of all links at Alice which will be used for transmission
mode selection. In the first phase, Alice estimates the CSI
corresponding to the Alice-Bob link, which can be achieved
by using pilot signaling from Bob. The relay nodes and John
also use the pilot signal to estimate their channel coefficients
to Bob. Then, each relay node sends a one-symbol pilot
signal (a deterministic known pilot signal transmitted over
one symbol duration) so that Alice, Bob and John estimate
their CSI to the relays. To make the channel estimation more
accurate, a set of pilot symbols can be transmitted by each
node instead of a single pilot symbol. The channels are then
fed back to Alice to decide on the selected mode. If the
RDHT mode is selected, Alice broadcasts the index of the
relay selected for information forwarding to notify all the
relay nodes, Bob, and John about the relay-selection process
completion.
The transmission time (i.e., time slot) is divided into two
time subslots of equal duration T2 . If the direct link is secure,
the DSHT mode is selected and the two time subslots will
be utilized by Alice to send the confidential information to
Bob directly. If this mode is not secured, the RDHT mode
is selected and one of the relays will be selected to forward
the Alice’s transmission. Our proposed scheme as shown in
Fig. 2 is summarized as follows
• If the DSHT mode is selected, Alice broadcasts her
information to Bob and the relays. All relays listen
to the transmitted information over the entire time
slot duration, and as mentioned earlier, they adopt the
power-splitting scheme to simultaneously process the
information and harvest energy. Simultaneously, John
injects a jamming signal to degrade the channels of
all relays but not Bob’s channel to prevent causing
any interference at Bob’s receiver. Hence, the jamming
signals are injected to only degrade the untrusted relays’
channels.
2We assume a fixed-rate packet transmissions where the target secrecy rate
is Rs bits/sec/Hz. That is, within a time slot of duration T , the information
signal is transmitted in fixed-size packets of Hs bits. Assuming that the
channel bandwidth isW Hz, the target secrecy rate isRs = HsTW bits/sec/Hz.
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FIGURE 2. The transmission block structures for different transmission
strategies. (a) Direct transmission. (b) Cooperative relay transmission.
• If the RDHT mode is selected, the transmission occurs
over two time subslots as follows.
– Assume that relay r` is selected for information
forwarding. During the first time subslot, similar to
the DSHT mode, Alice broadcasts her information
to Bob and the relays. However, at the same
time, Bob injects a jamming signal to hurt all the
relays while John injects a jamming signal to hurt
all relays except the information forwarding relay
(relay `) to prevent causing any interference at Bob
when that relay forwards Alice’s signal.3
– During the second time subslot, if at least one
of the relay nodes is active (i.e., has energy
more than P◦T/2), this active relay will transmit
an amplified-version of Alice’s transmission.
Simultaneously, John injects a jamming signal
orthogonal to the direction of the channel vector
of his link to Bob to avoid interfering with
Bob while interfering with all relays (including
relay r`). This jamming signal is important to i)
further power the relay nodes; and ii) due to their
malicious behavior, the relays may eavesdrop the
information-forwarding relay’s signal. By using
this jamming signal, the received signal will
have very low signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) and it will be useless for the
relays. Hence, they cannot combine the received
signals from Alice or the information-forwarding
relay. Accordingly, the non-selected relay nodes
will use the entire received signal from the
information-forwarding relay for energy harvesting
(i.e., they set ρ = 1).
During the RDHT mode, we have two time subslots.
Hence, in the κ-th time subslot of transmission, κ ∈ {1, 2},
we denote the AWGN due to signal processing at receiver
j by n(κ)j . As assumed in most of the SWIPT literature,
the contribution of the antenna noise at relay rk , ∀k ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,K }, is very small (and negligible). When the
3If the selected relay forwards John’s jamming signal, the jamming signal
will degrade Bob’s receiver.
DSHT mode is used, the superscript κ in n(κ)j is omitted.
In the following, we provide the details of the proposed
transmission modes.
1) DSHT MODE
If direct transmission is secured (i.e., the instantaneous
secrecy rate is higher than the target secrecy rate), it is useless
and energy-inefficient to get any help from the untrusted
relay nodes. Hence, Alice uses the entire time slot, T , for
direct transmissions to Bob. At the same time, the relay
nodes should harvest Alice’s signal energy to accumulate
more energy in their batteries, but since they are untrusted,
they might eavesdrop on the confidential information. To
prevent information leakage in such eavesdropping attacks,
while Alice transmits her information signal, x, to Bob with
transmit power level Pa, John transmits a jamming signal
vector zJ with transmit power level PJ , where x and the
elements of zJ are zero-mean circularly-symmetric random
variables with unit variances. Hence, the received signal at
Bob is given by
ya,b =
√
Paha,bx +
√
PJ
NJ − 1hJ ,bU1zJ + nb. (1)
where hJ ,b ∈ C1×NJ is the channel vector of the John-Bob
link and
√
PJ
NJ−1hJ ,bU1zJ is the AN signal vector transmitted
by John. John selects his AN-precoding matrix, denoted by
U1, to be canceled at Bob during the DSHT transmission.
Hence, U1 is designed such that
hJ ,bU1 = 01×(NJ−1), U∗1U1 = INJ−1. (2)
where U1 is the AN precoding matrix which should be
orthonormal column to maintain the average transmit power
fixed.4 Since hJ ,b is 1× NJ , there are (NJ −1) directions that
are orthogonal to hJ ,b. Thus,U1 has (NJ−1) columns. Hence,
the direct transmission SNR at Bob is given by 0a,b = 1a,b.
On the other hand, the relays have no knowledge about the
jamming signal. Thus, the received RF signal at the input of
relay rk is expressed as
ya,rk =
√
Paha,rk x +
√
PJ
NJ − 1hJ ,rkU1zJ + nrk . (3)
where hJ ,rk ∈ C1×NJ is the channel vector of the link
between John and relay rk , and U1 ∈ CNJ×(NJ−1) is
the AN-precoding matrix used at John. The relay nodes
are assumed to be eavesdroppers that attempt to decode
4To obtain an orthonormal-column matrix U1, the singular value
decomposition method can be used to obtain the solution of hJ ,bU1 =
01×(NJ−1) where the columns of U1 are the right singular vectors of h>J ,b
corresponding to zero singular values. An alternative method to design
hJ ,bU1 = 01×(NJ−1) is to set the columns of U1 to be W√Tr{WW∗} where
W = INJ − h>J ,bhJ ,b is a projection matrix that projects a vector to a
subspace orthogonal to h>J ,b. In this case, the column size ofU1 isNJ instead
of NJ − 1. Hence, we need to change the size of zJ to NJ . However, the
matrix W√
Tr{WW∗} is not orthonormal-column matrix but it does not change
the transmit power due to the normalization factor
√
Tr{WW∗}.
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the messages transmitted from Alice. Hence, based on the
adopted power-splitting EH scheme, each relay node rk splits
the received signal into two streams:
√
ρya,rk for harvesting
energy and
√
ρya,rk for decoding the information signal.
Similar to the literature, we ignore the harvested energy
from the antenna noise [26]. Hence, the received signal
to be used for information processing at relay rk can be
expressed as
yprocessa,rk =
√
ρPaha,rk x +
√
ρ
PJ
NJ − 1hJ ,rkU1zJ + nrk . (4)
Based on (4), the instantaneous SINR at relay rk is given by
0a,rk =
ρ1a,rk
ρ PJNJ−1‖hJ ,rkU1‖2 + 1
. (5)
Hence, when the DSHT mode is used, the achievable secrecy
rate is given by
RDSHTs =
log2
 1+ 0a,b
1+ max
k∈{1,...,K }{0a,rk }
+ . (6)
Since Alice sends her information signal over the time slot
duration, the harvested energy at the relay nodes during the
DSHT mode is Ekh,DSHT, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K }, where
Ekh,DSHT = ηρ
(
Paga,rk +
PJ
NJ − 1‖hJ ,rkU1‖
2
)
T . (7)
2) RDHT MODE
when the DSHT mode cannot satisfy the target secrecy
rate requirement, the RDHT mode is selected where Alice
transmits the information signal
√
Pax, during the first time
subslot, while all the relay nodes listen. Bob and John start
to send jamming signals to confuse the relays where Bob
sends the jamming signal to confuse all the relays while
John sends a jamming signal to confuse all the relays except
the one that will forward the data signal since jamming that
information-forwarding relay will also jam Bob when he
receives the jammed signal. In the first time subslot, the
received signal at relay rk is given by
ya,rk =
√
Paha,rk x +
√
Pbhb,rk zb +
√
PJhJ ,rkU2zJ + nrk ,
(8)
where zb is Bob’s jamming signal which is modeled as a
zero-mean circularly-symmetric random variable with unit
variance, and U2zJ is John’s jamming signal vector during
the first subslot.
The received signal to be used for information processing
at relay rk can be expressed as
yprocessa,rk =
√
ρPaha,rk x +
√
ρPbhb,rk zb
+√ρPJhJ ,rkU2zJ + nrk . (9)
To avoid forwarding the AN signal by the selected relay at
Bob, the jammer should cancel the AN at the relay selected
for information forwarding. Hence, the AN precoding matrix
during the first phase of the time slot is given by
hJ ,r`U2 = 01×(NJ−1), U∗2U2 = INJ−1. (10)
From (9), the instantaneous SINR at relay rk is
given by
0a,rk =
ρ1a,rk
ρ PJNJ−1‖hJ ,rkU2‖2 + ρgb,rkPb + 1
. (11)
When k = `, since ‖hJ ,r`U2‖2 = 0 from (10), we have
0a,r` =
ρ1a,r`
ρgb,r`Pb + 1
. (12)
The amount of harvested energy at all relays except the
relay selected during the first time subslot of the RDHTmode
is given by
Ekh,1=ηρ(Paga,rk + Pbgb,rk +
PJ
NJ−1‖hJ ,rkU2‖
2)
T
2
. (13)
The energy harvested at the selected relay for information
forwarding is given by
E`h,1=ηρ(Paga,r` + Pbgb,r`)
T
2
. (14)
In the second time subslot, only one active relay
r` (if any) amplifies the received signal from Alice,√
ρya,r` , by multiplying it with a weighting gain G =√
P`
ρPaga,r`+ρPbgb,r`+1 and forwards the resultant signal to Bob.
The forwarded signal from the selected relay is given by
xr` = G
(√
ρPaha,r`x +
√
ρPbhb,r`zb + n(1)r`
)
. (15)
Since Bob knows the AN that he generated, he cancels it from
the received signal prior to information decoding. Hence, the
received signal at Bob, after removing his jamming signal zb,
is given by
ya,r`,b =
√
ρPaGha,r`hr`,bx + Ghr`,dn(1)r` + n(2)b . (16)
The unselected relays (rk (k 6= `)) can intercept the
transmission during the second time subslot. The received
signal at rk is given by
ya,r`,rk =
√
ρPaGha,r`hr`,rk x +
√
ρPbGhb,r`hr`,rk zb
+
√
ρ
PJ
NJ−1hJ ,rkU1zJ+Ghr`,rkn
(1)
r` +n(2)rk . (17)
The purpose of the jamming signal from John during the
second time subslot, given by
√
ρ PJNJ−1hJ ,rkU1zJ , is to
energize the relays for future transmissions and prevent
them from performing maximal ratio combining. It is
noteworthy that the precoder during the second time subslot
of the RDHT mode is designed as in the DSHT mode
since John can jam everywhere except the John-Bob vector
direction.
In the RDHT mode, the non-selected relay nodes may
attempt to eavesdrop on the transmission during the
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second hop. Hence, they may combine the signals over
the two time subslots (signal from Alice and from the
information-forwarding relay) to decode Alice’s information
signal more reliably. However, since the selected relay uses
an AF relaying scheme, combining the two received signals
at the non-selected relays will not help in decoding the
confidential information since the AN signals from both Bob
and John and the additional relayed AWGN samples from
the information-forwarding relay will significantly degrade
the signal received over the second time subslot at the
non-selected relays. In addition, John will also jam the
second time subslot to further prevent the untrusted relays
from eavesdropping and to further energize them. In other
words, securing the Alice-relay transmissions is enough to
ensure the security of the entire two-hop transmission since
the relayed signal by the information-forwarding relay is
actually the received signal from Alice (which is degraded
by the jamming signal from Bob) in addition to the AWGN
signal (due to signal processing at the selected relay) and
the jamming signal from John. Hence, the received signal
during the second subslot at the non-selected relays will
be very weak for data decoding but is a good signal for
accumulating more energy at the relays. In addition to the
aforementioned reasons, the relays should collect as much
energy as they can during the second time subslot to be
able to help Alice in future time slots. Furthermore, as
in the untrusted relaying literature [26], [27], [29]–[31],
the relays nodes are assumed to be honest and trusted at
the service level and untrusted at the information level.
Hence, they should obey the legitimate system and follow
the orders. Consequently, during the second time subslot of
the RDHT mode, the non-selected relay nodes will harvest
energy.
When the RDHT mode is used, the instantaneous secrecy
rate is given by
RRDHTs,` =
1
2
log2
 1+ 0a,r`,b
1+ max
k∈{1,...,K }{0a,rk }
+ , (18)
where
0a,r`,b =
ρ1a,r`1r`,b
ρ1a,r` + ρ1a,r` +1r`,b + 1
(19)
denotes the received SNR at Bob from the signal received
from the selected relay. The secrecy rate is reduced by a factor
of two since Alice uses just half the time slot to transmit
the same information. When the DSHT mode is insecure,
the K relay nodes harvest energy from Alice’s information
transmission and John’s jamming signal in the first time
subslot. In the second time subslot, the selected relay node
amplifies-and-forwards the received signal to Bob while the
other relay nodes use the entire subslot duration to harvest
energywith ρ = 1 from both the selected relay’s transmission
and the jamming signal transmission from John. Hence, the
harvested energy at rk (k 6= `) during the second time subslot
is given by
Ekh,2 = η
(
Paga,r`G2gr`,rk + Pbgb,r`G2gr`,rk
+ PJ
NJ − 1‖hJ ,rkU1‖
2 + G2gr`,rk
)
T
2
, ∀k 6= `.
(20)
If the direct link is in secrecy outage and cannot support
the target secrecy rate, the amount of harvested energy at
the relay nodes r` and rk (k 6= `) are given by E`h,1 and
Ekh,RDHT = Ekh,1 + Ekh,2, respectively. If none of the relay
nodes had accumulated sufficient energy to transmit, Alice
and the relay nodes remain silent and the overall system is in
outage.
C. RELAY SELECTION SCHEME
We propose a two-step relay selection scheme which is based
on both the CSI of the wireless links and the ESI of the
batteries at the relay nodes. In the first step, based on the ESI
at batteries, only a subset 2 with cardinality |2| ≤ K of the
relay nodes will be active. This active subset is representing
the subset of the relays that can aid Alice. The subset 2 is
constructed as
2 = {rk |E0,k ≥ P◦ T2 , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K }}, (21)
where E0,k denotes the ESI of relay rk at the beginning of
the time slot. In the second step, the relay node in2 with the
highest secrecy rate is selected. That is, r` is selected as
` = argmax
rk∈2
RRDHTs,k . (22)
To ensure a secure transmission (i.e., perfect information
secrecy), RRDHTs,k ≥ Rs. Otherwise, the secrecy is
compromised. If the best relay secrecy rate cannot guarantee
the Rs bits/sec/Hz, then all other active relays cannot
guarantee it. Hence, the system is in secrecy outage. If none
of the active relays in set 2 satisfy RRDHTs,k ≥ Rs, we define
I = 0 which implies that there is no relaying and all nodes
will be idle.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. ENERGY STORAGE MODEL
To analyze the performance of our proposed scheme, we
characterize the dynamic behaviors of the relays’ batteries.
Since we assume a cluster of relay nodes, the DSHT mode
corresponds to an increase of the battery energy levels
for all relays with the same average amount of energy.
When the RDHT mode is used, the first time subslot
corresponds to an increase of the battery energy levels
for all relays with different amounts of average energy. In
the second time subslot, the battery energy level of the
selected relay for information forwarding may decrease.
Hence, the energy-accumulation process at the relay nodes
depends on both the channel condition of the Alice-Bob
link and their own energy storage levels. The probability of
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secure transmission from Alice to Bob without relaying is
given by
µDSHT = Pr
[
RDSHTs ≥ Rs
]
. (23)
If both the DSHT mode and the RDHT mode are not
secure, Alice and the selected relay should not send any
information signals. Moreover, John and Bob remain idle
and do not send jamming signals. Hence, relay nodes are
only used when the RDHT mode satisfies the target secrecy
rate.
In wireless networks, due to the time-varying channel
conditions, the RF-EH rates at the EH nodes are randomly
fluctuating over time. Moreover, the selected relay for
information forwarding varies from one coherence time (time
slot) to another. Based on these two facts, the batteries’
state transitions are modeled as a discrete-time finite-state
Markov chain (MC) that evolves on a finite state space
S = {ψ0, . . . , ψL}, where L denotes the number of discrete
energy levels. We define ψi as the state when the relay’s
residual energy in its battery is δi = iEmaxL = iδ1 where
δ1 = EmaxL . Thus, during the n-th time subslot, when the
RDHT mode is used, the discretized amount of the harvested
energy for relay rk is given by
ξ kh,n =
⌊
Ekh,n
δ1
⌋
δ1, (24)
where b·c is the floor function. The total energy accumulated
over the two subslots during the RDHT mode is given by
ξ kh,RDHT = ξ kh,1+ξ kh,2. The amount of energy harvested during
the DSHT mode is
ξ kh,DSHT =
⌊
Ekh,DSHT
δ1
⌋
δ1, (25)
When the RDHT mode is used, the discretized value of the
transmission energy at the selected relay in the second time
subslot is given by
δt =
⌈
P◦T
2δ1
⌉
δ1, (26)
where d·e is the ceiling function.
Let Em0,k denote the battery energy level of the k-th relay at
the beginning of the m-th transmission time slot and assume
that relay ` is selected. Then, according to the proposed
scheme, the battery energy level at the end of the m-th time
slot (or at the beginning of the (m+1)-th time slot), denoted by
Em+10,k , is given by (27) at the top of the next page where 1[·]
denotes an indicator function that equals one if its argument
is true and zero otherwise.
A relay node is a candidate for selection if, in the beginning
of a time slot, its battery energy level exceeds δt . Let ζ ki
denote an indicator which is equal to one if the i-th battery
energy level of the k-th relay is higher than the energy
level required for information forwarding, δi ≥ δt , and
zero otherwise. On the other hand, the state transition may
occur between the two consecutive time slots. Hence, the
transition probabilities of the MC are time dependent and
the MC is considered as a time non-homogeneous. In this
case, a standard MC cannot capture the heterogeneity in
battery energy level evolution over the two transmission
phases. If the current battery state of the k-th relay node
is ψi, it transits to state ψl at the first time subslot with
probability p(1)k,(i,l), then to state ψj in the second time subslot
with probability p(2)k,(l,j). Based on the Markov property, the
transitions ψi → ψl and ψl → ψj are independent events.
Hence, we split the state transition process into two stages
and construct two independent transition probability matrices
(X(1)k and X
(2)
k ), one for each stage, where the transition
probability matrix is defined as
[
X(n)k
]
(i,j)
= p(n)k,(i,j), for
i, j = 0, . . . ,L. To decouple the interaction among the
relays’ batteries, we assume while solving the MCs that a
relay loses δt energy units when the relay is selected for
relaying, which occurs with probability 1/K since the relays
are located in a cluster, the relay is active (i.e., its battery
level is higher than δt ), and the relaying link is secured (i.e.,
its secrecy rate is at least equal to the target secrecy rate
Rs bits/sec/Hz). Moreover, a transmission occurs under the
RDHT mode when the selected relaying link can securely
support the target secrecy rate. Hence, these approximations
underestimate the performance of our proposed scheme. Let
pi
(n)
i , i = 0, . . . ,L, be the steady-state probability of being in
the i-th state after the n-th time subslot of the transmission
block at the k-th relay. The channels in the network
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). Hence, all relay nodes have the same transition
matrices, and then identical stationary distribution for all
relay nodes. Hereinafter, unless necessary, we will omit the
index k .
1) FIRST TIME SUBSLOT ANALYSIS
Regardless of the used transmission mode, the first phase
implies an increase in the relays’ batteries energy levels
only. In the DSHT mode, all the relays’ batteries energy
levels increase with the same average amount of energy.
However, in the RDHT mode, the non-selected relays will
harvest more energy than the selected one because they
will receive the jamming signal from John. Assuming
that relays are in a cluster, each active relay has an
equal chance to be selected with a probability given by
1
|2| , where |2| is the cardinality of 2. As a function
of the cardinality of the active set, this probability
is time-dependent. On the other hand, the stationary
distribution of each relay battery status is time-independent.
Alternatively, we use the lower-bound 1K . We summarize all
the transition probabilities into the following four general
cases.
1) The battery remains unchanged (ψi → ψi with 0 ≤
i < L): The battery remains unchanged if, during the
first time subslot, the discretized amount of harvested
energy from either the DSHT mode or the RDHT
mode is less than one energy level, δ1. The transition
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Em+10,k =

min
(
Em0,k + ξ kh,DSHT,Emax
)
, if RDSHTs ≥ Rs
min
(
Em0,k + ξ kh,1 + ξ kh,2(1− 1[k = `])− δt1[k = `],Emax
)
, if {RDSHTs < Rs} ∩ {I = 1}
Em0,k , if {RDSHTs < Rs} ∩ {I = 0}.
(27)
probability is thus given by
p(1)(i,i)=µDSHT Pr
[
ξ kh,DSHT
2
= 0
]
+ µDSHTγ
×
[
ζ ki
K
Pr
[
ξ `h,1 = 0
]
+
(
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
)
Pr
[
ξ kh,1 = 0
]]
=µDSHTFEkh,DSHT (2δ1)+ µDSHTγ
×
[
ζ ki
K
FE`h,1
(δ1)+
(
ζ ki (K−γ )
K
+ζ ki
)
FEkh,1(
δ1)
]
.
(28)
where γ = Pr
[
RRDHTs,k ≥ Rs
]
which is independent
of the index k since the relays are located in a
cluster.
2) The battery remains fully charged (ψL → ψL): Under
the practical assumption of finite-capacity energy
storage at the untrusted RF-EH relays, any received
energy that overflows their capacity Emax cannot be
stored and the extra energy will be lost. Hence, ψL is
an absorbing state and the transition probability from
state ψL to itself is given by
p(1)(L,L) = 1. (29)
3) The battery is partially charged (ψi→ ψj with 0 ≤ i ≤
j < L): When the battery is not full, (i.e., δi < δL), a
non-zero discretized harvested energy less than δL − δi
will lead to an increase of the battery to an intermediate
level j. The transition probability ψi → ψj is
given by
p(1)(i,j)=µDSHT Pr
[
δj − δi <
ξ kh,DSHT
2
< δj+1 − δi
]
+µDSHTγ
[
ζ ki
K
Pr
[
δj−δi<ξ `h,1<δj+1−δi
]
+
(
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
)
Pr
×
[
δj − δi < ξ kh,1 < δj+1 − δi
]
=µDSHT
(
FEkh,DSHT
(
2
(
δj+1 − δi
))
−FEkh,DSHT
(
2
(
δj − δi
)))
+µDSHTγ
[
ζ ki
K
(
FE`h,1
(
δj+1−δi
)−FE`h,1 (δj−δi))
+
(
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
)
×
(
FEkh,1
(
δj+1 − δi
)
−FEkh,1
(
δj − δi
)) ]
. (30)
4) The non-full battery is fully charged (ψi → ψL with
0 ≤ i < L): In this case, a non-zero discretized
harvested energy higher than δL − δi fully charges the
battery. The state transition probability from level i to
level L is given by
p(1)(i,L) = µDSHT Pr
[
ξ kh,DSHT > δL − δi
]
+µDSHTγ
[
ζ ki
K
Pr
[
ξ `h,1 > δL − δi
]
+
(
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
)
Pr
[
ξ kh,1 > δL − δi
]]
= µDSHT
(
1− FEkh,DSHT (2 (δL − δi))
)
+µDSHTγ
[
ζ ki
K
(
1− FE`h,1 (δL − δi)
)
+
(
ζ ki (K−γ )
K
+ζ ki
)(
1−FEkh,1 (δL−δi)
)]
.
(31)
Since there is no energy expenditure in the first time
subslot, only the transitions involving an increase in the
battery energy level can occur. Therefore, the transition
matrix X(1) is upper triangular.
2) SECOND TIME SUBSLOT ANALYSIS
During the second time subslot, a relay’s battery level can
decrease by δt energy units only when the RDHT mode is
activated and the relay was selected to retransmit Alice’s
transmission to Bob. Otherwise, the relay’s battery can either
increase or remain unchanged. In fact, if the DSHT mode is
activated, the source continues its transmission while all the
relays harvest. On the other hand, if the RDHT is activated,
the non-selected relay nodes accumulate further energy in
their batteries for future use. In the following, to compute the
state distribution of the considered Markov model, we first
find the state transition probabilities for the second time
subslot.
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1) The battery remains unchanged (ψi → ψi with
0 ≤ i < L): The battery remains unchanged if the
relay is harvesting energy during the second subslot.
However, the harvested energy is low and incapable of
powering the relay’s battery. In this case, the transition
probability from state ψi to state ψi is given by
p(2)(i,i) = µDSHT Pr
[
ξ kh,DSHT
2
= 0
]
+µDSHTγ
[
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
]
Pr
[
ξ kh,2 = 0
]
= µDSHTFEkh,DSHT (2δ1)
+µDSHTγ
[
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
]
FEkh,2 (
δ1).
(32)
2) The battery remains fully charged (ψL → ψL): When
the relay’s battery is full, an overflow event occurs if
either the DSHT mode is activated or the relay is not
selected for information forwarding when the RDHT
mode is activated. Hence, the transition probability is
given by
p(2)(L,L) = µDSHT + µDSHT
(K − γ )
K
. (33)
3) The battery is partially charged (ψi → ψj with
0 ≤ i ≤ j < L): If the relay harvests a non-zero
discretized amount of energy that is less than δL−δi, the
battery energy level increase from energy level i to an
intermediate energy level jwith a transition probability
given by
p(2)(i,j) = µDSHT Pr
[
δj − δi <
ξ kh,DSHT
2
< δj+1 − δi
]
+µDSHTγ
(
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
)
Pr
×
[
δj − δi < ξ kh,2 < δj+1 − δi
]
= µDSHT
(
FEkh,DSHT
(
2
(
δj+1 − δi
))
−FEkh,DSHT
(
2
(
δj − δi
)))
+µDSHTγ
(
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
)
×
(
FEkh,2
(
δj+1 − δi
)− FEkh,2 (δj − δi)) (34)
4) The non-full battery is fully charged (ψi → ψL with
0 ≤ i < L): The relay’s battery is fully charged with a
probability given by
p(2)(i,L) = µDSHT Pr
[
ξ kh,DSHT
2
> δL − δi
]
+µDSHTγ
(
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
)
Pr
×
[
ξ kh,2 > δL − δi
]
= µDSHT
(
1− FEkh,DSHT (2 (δL − δi))
)
+µDSHTγ
(
ζ ki (K − γ )
K
+ ζ ki
)
×
(
1− FEkh,2 (δL − δi)
)
. (35)
5) The non-empty battery is discharged (ψi → ψj with
0 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ L): If the relay is selected for information
forwarding, which occurs with probability 1/K when
the relays are clustered, the relay’s battery is reduced
by δt energy units. Hence, the transition probability is
given by
p(2)(i,j) = µDSHTγ
ζ ki
K
× 1(δi − δt = δj), (36)
Based on the Chapman-Kolmogorov identity [41], [42],5
the two-stage transition probabilities are given by
p(i,j) =
L∑
l=i
p(1)(i,l)p
(2)
(l,j). (37)
It turns out that in general, computing X is accomplished via
matrix multiplication
X = X(1) × X(2). (38)
Since the MC is finite-state, irreducible, and aperiodic, all
states are positive recurrent and ergodic.6 The steady-state
distribution vector for the proposed protocol at an arbitrary
relay is computed by calculating higher powers of the matrix
as follows [42]
pi = pi (0) × X∞, (39)
where pi is the steady-state distribution with its i-th element
as the probability that the battery is in state i, denoted by pii,
and pi 0 is any initial steady-state distribution [42].
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY (SOP)
In our proposed scheme, whenever the target secrecy rate
Rs is not satisfied under the DSHT mode, the relay nodes
are involved to achieve the target secrecy rate through
cooperative diversity. Hence, the communications system is
in outage if the instantaneous secrecy rates of both DSHT
mode and RDHT mode fall below the target secrecy rate,Rs
bits/sec/Hz. Consequently, an outage event may occur if (1)
the instantaneous secrecy rate of the Alice-Bob link without
relaying fails to achieve the target secrecy rate, and (2) when
the active-relay set, 2, is empty or the transmission from the
5The transitionmatrix at time t+s, denoted byP(t+s), is equal toP(t)P(s).
6An MC is said to be irreducible if and only if all states communicate
[43]. Moreover, an MC is said to be aperiodic if all states are aperiodic; a
state is aperiodic if and only if there exists a time t such that pi (t)i,i > 0 and
pi
(t+1)
i,i > 0 [43].
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selected relay fails to achieve the target secrecy Rs. Hence,
the SOP of the system is given by
Pout = µDSHT
(δt−1∑
i=0
pii
)K
+
K∑
k=1
(
K
k
) L∑
i=δt
pii
k(δt−1∑
i=0
pii
)K−k
Pksec
.
(40)
where
(
K
k
)
is K choose k , and Pksec = Pr
[
max
k∈2 R
RDHT
s,k <
Rs
]
is the probability that the instantaneous secrecy rate is
lower than the target secrecy rate given that there are k = |2|
active relays. It is noteworthy that since the relays are in a
cluster, the probability Pksec is only a function of the number
of active relays.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the analytical findings are verified through
simulations. In addition, we provide the performance
comparison between DSHT-only mode, RDHT-only mode,
and the proposed scheme and investigate the impact of the
system parameters on their SOPs. Without loss of generality,
we consider a normalized relay network in a square of unit
area, where all distances are normalized. The coordinates of
the source (Alice) s the destination (Bob) d and the jammer
(John) J are are (0, 0.5), (1, 0.5) and (0.5,0.6), respectively.
The untrusted relay nodes in the network are grouped into
a cluster and thus they have the same coordinate (0.5,0.5).
Unless otherwise stated, we set the simulation parameters
as follows: energy harvesting efficiency η = 0.6, path loss
exponent β = 3, the number of antennas at the jammer is
NJ = 4 and Pb = PJ = Pr = 15 dBm. The power
splitting factor is ρ = 0.5. Each channel coefficient between
any antenna pair is assumed to be a complex zero-mean
circularly-symmetric Gaussian random variable with unit
variance. For simplicity, all the noise powers are set to
be 0 dBm.
In Figs. 3 and 4, the SOP is depicted versus Alice’s
transmission power for different jamming signals power
levels at Bob and John. In these two figures, we compare the
SOPs of the DSHT-only mode, the RDHT-only mode, and
our proposed adaptive transmission scheme. Our proposed
adaptive scheme always outperforms the conventional
systems (DSHT and RDHT) when both the jammer and the
destination help in reducing the leakage rate to the untrusted
relays. In fact, as the number of jamming nodes increases,
more confusion is caused for the untrusted relays and more
energy is harvested at the relays. As a result, the SOP
decreases due to increased secrecy rates and the availability of
more active relays. Moreover, due to the time-varying nature
of wireless fading channels, the relay link may not be always
better than the direct link and vice versa. The DSHT mode
FIGURE 3. The SOP versus Alice’s transmit power when
Rs = 1 bits/sec/Hz, K = 5, NJ = 4 and Emax = 50.
FIGURE 4. The SOP versus Alice’s transmit power when PJ = 5 dBm,
Pb = 15 dBm andRs = 1 bits/sec/Hz.
shows a good performance at high levels of Pa while the
RDHT mode is very promising for low-to-medium levels of
Pa. Clearly, the DSHT mode is better than the RDHT mode
when the direct link is significantly stronger than the relaying
link, while the RDHT mode will perform better when the
direct link is relatively weak. Hence, a proper transmission
mode selection scheme significantly enhances the system
security, provided that perfect CSI is available at the control
unit (e.g., Alice or Bob). Furthermore, as Pa increases, the
SOPs of our proposed scheme and the DSHT mode decrease,
although the SOP of the RDHTmode first decreases and then
increases. This is because, the data rate of the Alice-relay
link decreases as Pa decreases and, hence, Bob’s jamming
signal has more harmful impact on the relays. Accordingly, it
becomes more difficult for the selected relay to successfully
decode Alice’s information signal. However, despite using
the DBJ scheme, whenPa is larger thanPb, the data rate of the
Alice-relay link may be higher than the direct link data rate
which, in turn, increases the SOP. This reveals that the secrecy
performance of the RDHT mode reduces when Alice uses a
transmission power higher than Bob’s jamming power Pb.
The effect of the jamming power at the destination is
investigated in Fig. 3. The secrecy performance of the DSHT
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mode is independent of Pb. However, when Pb decreases, the
SOP of the RDHT mode increases. Since the RDHT mode
is frequently selected for low values of Pa, the SOP of our
proposed scheme increases as Pb increases. Hence, when
Pa = 40 dBm, the direct link is strong enough to ensure the
target secrecy rate Rs without the help of the relay nodes. If
Pb = 0 (i.e., no jamming from Bob), since the selected relay
for information forwarding r` will have better channel to Bob
than Alice, the achievable secrecy rate of the RDHT mode is
zero. Hence, the RDHT mode will not be used at all and the
system’s SOP will be the same as that of DSHT mode. On
the other hand, the effect of PJ is shown in Fig. 4 where we
observe that the SOP becomes high for the no-jamming cases
for all schemes. Without jamming, the relay channel is better
than the direct-link channel which leads to zero instantaneous
secrecy rate through the use of the DSHT mode. Thus, Alice
will always select the two-hop transmission mode where, for
secrecy purpose, Bob ignores the direct link to transmit a
jamming signal during the first phase.
FIGURE 5. The SOP versus the x-coordinate of the relays and
x-coordinate of the jammer when Pa = 20 dBm, PJ = 5 dBm,
Pb = 15 dBm andRs = 1 bits/sec/Hz.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the SOP of our proposed scheme
as a function of the x-coordinate of the relays and the
x-coordinate of the cooperative jammer (John), denoted by
xJ . These two figures demonstrate that, according to the
John’s location, there are two limited areas where the relays
could compromise the secrecy of the system. These areas
are the ones where the relays are located close to Alice and
Bob. We observe that for when the x-coordinate of the relay’s
location xr ≤ 0.3 (i.e., the relay is closer to the source)
the SOP increases as John moves far away from the source
and toward to the destination (i.e., xJ grows). In fact, when
John is far away from the untrusted relays, his jamming is
less effective in improving the secrecy performance. For the
RDHT mode, when xr decreases, the SOP increases. This is
because, relays are supposed to be cooperative in forwarding
the information from Alice but they are not trusted. Hence,
to have secure communications, the relays should be closer
to the source. On the other hand, when relays are close
to the destination, the first-hop becomes the bottleneck
FIGURE 6. The SOP versus the x-coordinate of the relays and
x-coordinate of the jammer when Pa = 20 dBm, PJ = 15 dBm,
Pb = 5 dBm andRs = 1 bits/sec/Hz.
for the dual-hop communications since the performance
gain achieved from the second-hop is significantly higher.
Moreover, when the relays are located far away from the
source, the harvested energy at the relays becomes limited
since the distance is high.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new AN-aided relay-selection scheme to
secure a wireless-powered untrusted AF-relay network. We
analyzed the systemâĂŹs secrecy rates and SOPs.We showed
that our proposed scheme outperforms the benchmark
schemes. We demonstrated that increasing the number of
jamming nodes and jamming powers from the cooperative
jammer or the destination node will increase the security of
the transmissions as well as the amount of energy transferred
to the relays; hence, they will be able to help the source’s
transmissions in more time slots. We showed that the security
is more compromised when the relays are located close to
Alice and Bob. That is, in the RDHT mode, when the relays
are closer to Alice, the SOP increases since the relays are
supposed to forward Alice’s transmission but they are not
trusted. Hence, to secure communications, the relays should
be closer to Alice. On the other hand, when relays are close
to Bob, the first-hop becomes the bottleneck for the dual-hop
communications since the performance gain achieved from
the second-hop is significantly higher. Moreover, when the
relays are located far away from Alice, the harvested energy
at the relays becomes limited due to the large distance. In
addition, the SOP increases as John moves far away from
Alice towards Bob. In fact, when John is far away from the
untrusted relays, the impact of his jamming signal is low and
less energy transfer occurs from John to the relays. Finally, we
showed that for the RDHT-only scheme, there is an optimal
transmit power level for Alice that minimizes the SOP.
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